Introduction
The ongoing election in Egypt and the forthcoming elections in Libya will in many ways define the domestic and international political directions that both nations take in the transition from dictatorship to a new order. Neither government has drafted or ratified permanent constitutions. In Egypt, the elected parliament is already functioning and the body comprised of its members that will write the new constitution has been nominated. Yet the president – who will not be elected until after the second round on 16 June 2012 – must request that it do so before the process begins. Libyans will also determine the course of the nation when they elect a parliament in June (now delayed until a date yet to be announced) whose members will also make up the committee charged with drafting the nation’s first constitution. As each country moves towards establishing a legal framework that will govern its people and processes for the next foreseeable future, stability and security continue as foremost concerns both for their citizens and international observers.
Libya
This is particularly true for Libya where revolutionary militias do not appear willing to relent control over turf or weapons even though the need for their presence has dwindled. Indeed, they provided much needed security immediately following the war, but the government implemented its plan to integrate former fighters into its national army and police in late December 2011, and they now have other options. Yet their prolonged presence has allowed the militias the ability to influence politics during the transition. For example, in late April and early May, militias took posts outside of government buildings in Tripoli to demand a stronger role in the interim government and after elections. Until elections are held, the hold militias have on outcomes are sure to be disproportionate relative to their numbers. Since the outset of the transitional period, former fighters have refused to stand down because they viewed themselves as the guarantors of the revolution and the last hope for ensuring a transition to representative government. After elections, originally slated for 19 June but now delayed, and particularly after the constitution is drafted within six months of the meeting of the first assembly, maintaining such a position will become increasingly difficult to justify.
The other key issue regarding elections in Libya will be the legitimacy of the entire process. There has been no national poll held in half a century, and the 2006 census data being used to identify voters is widely discredited as a manipulation of the Gaddafi regime. Elections processes are independently being organized and conducted at the municipal level by local actors, which also presents a direct challenge to the efforts of the new High National Election Council (HNEC) to enforce its districting preferences. If the results of the elections are not generally accepted as legitimate by the majority of Libyans, the already precarious security situation could deteriorate further, and quickly. The eastern region has already called for a boycott of the June poll due to what leaders there consider a poorly organized voter registration program. Militias also have the potential to disrupt the implementation and accuracy of the elections process if they seek to intimidate voters into either selecting certain candidates or to stay away from polls altogether. Alternatively, if the process is relatively free and fair and electorate views the outcome as acceptable, even in the event that their preferred candidates and parties fail to win, the chances for a successful transition to stable governance are more favourable. Beyond June, the future of Libya’s legal and political environment will rest in the hands of the 200-member assembly and the constitution it creates.
Egypt
Egypt is also in line to write up a constitution, but the situation in Egypt is far more complex. Unlike in Libya, Egypt has a long history in holding elections even though the processes were manipulated by a series of authoritarian regimes to produce preferred results. Nonetheless, voter registration, identification and polling systems have long been in place and are unlikely to present an issue of legitimacy of outcomes. At this point, among the main factors of instability that remain has been the strain between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the public that has become increasingly disgruntled with it since taking over leadership of the transitional phase. The process for drafting Egypt’s new constitution – and the encroaching powers of the SCAF – is at the heart of this tension. The SCAF is perceived to have compounded the confusion inherent in the transitional phase by erratically and repeatedly changing the details of the constitution at will. In November 2011, the public grew increasingly doubtful of the intentions of the SCAF after the Deputy Prime Minister proposed a draft resolution that would constitutionally mandate the role of the military in government long after the parliamentary and presidential elections are held. Many hope that the election of a president and the transfer of power from the SCAF to a civilian government will be the first step of many that will be needed to reduce the role of the military in Egyptian politics.
These tensions and the debates that surround them often lay along the fault lines of political affiliations, although not necessarily in a clear fashion. For example, the thirteen candidates for presidential elections managed to pull support from a range of groups and parties of varied interests and aims, but only four were among the serious contenders. The first round of elections held in late May will now pit the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohammed Morsi, against Ahmed Shafiq, a Mubarak-era acolyte in run-off elections scheduled for June 16-17. As has been the case as Egypt develops its new political scene, there are no clear affiliations as voters head into the second round. Shafiq is popular among minority Christians and those seeking to restore security, but is adamantly rejected by revolutionaries as a repeat of Egypt’s authoritarian past. Alternatively, Morsi is favored by revolutionaries, but not the young progressive segment that helped to spark the revolution. Shafiq may have the advantage of Egypt’s powerful military institution supporting him. Yet Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood have a decades-old grassroots operation that has gained favour among Egypt’s middle and lower classes. Although many conservative Muslims, namely the Salafis, have expressed frustration with the Brotherhood for co-opting with the country’s corrupt leaders over the years, they are more likely to choose their fellow Islamists. No matter who Egyptians chose as their next leader, he will be the figurehead people look to for national direction, and similarly, who the public will blame if things go wrong. The powers vested in the president are many and the parliament has always played a secondary role; all those to fill its post before have been military officers and authoritarians. In this critical phase of Egypt’s first democratically elected government, the new president will take the opportunity to either reinforce the legacy of his predecessors or take further steps to move Egypt beyond its authoritarian past.
Conclusion
The elections in both Egypt and Libya will set the tone for the course their new governments will take as they transition away from the old order to an undetermined future. Most importantly, these elections will put in motion the process of developing the constitutions that will establish the means and methods by which each state is to be governed for some time to come. In Libya, the key obstacles to ensuring a safe transition to democratic rule are related to the logistical challenges of a weak central government: weak security, accurate voter rolls, sufficient polling stations, and electoral legitimacy. In Egypt, where government has centralized over decades in the hands of the executive, the opposite is true: established personalities, entrenched institutions and a strong military presence are the factors most likely to inhibit a smooth transition.
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